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remanufactured short life cycle products with green consumers Summary of abstract: Remanufacturing of
short-life-cycle product is an alternative to mitigate e-waste such as mobile phones and laptops that are
getting obsolete faster nowadays. Pricing is significant aspect to ensure successful remanufacturing
implementation. Several studies show the existence of green consumers. We study pricing decisions that
considers green segment consumers and propose several management insights. The results show that
integrated-scenario is better than independent-scenario, with higher profit. The existence of green segment
increases the profits of manufacturer and retailer, but limited. Price-sensitivity of new and remanufactured
products, demand’s-speed-of-change, and remanufacturing-cost influence the optimum prices as well as the
optimum green level. Keywords: pricing, remanufacturing, short life-cycle product, green consumers
ABSTRACT Remanufacturing has been studied quite extensively during the last decades, as one of product
recovery options that could extend product’s useful life and mitigate the environmental impact. Rapid
innovation in technology accelerates obsolescence and hence product life cycles are getting shorter and
wastes build up faster. Remanufacturing of short life-cycle product is an important alternative to mitigate the
waste. However, since there are impacts in implementing remanufacturing, such as cannibalization,
segmentation, and lower willingness to pay, pricing has become a significant aspect to ensure successful
remanufacturing business. Several studies show that there exists green segment consumer, who has higher
preference to purchase environmental-friendly products and higher willingness to pay for such products. In
this paper we study manufacturer’s and retailer’s pricing decision of short life-cycle product considering the
green segment consumers, and propose two scenarios i.e. independently optimized profit scenario under
Stackelberg game with manufacturer as the leader, and integrated scenario. The results show that the
integrated scenario achieves higher profit compared to the independent one, and both players are better off
under the integrated decision. We also find that the existence of green segment increases the profit of
manufacturer and retailer to a certain level, before it erodes manufacturer’s profit when the green level is too
high. Also, price sensitivity of new and remanufactured products, demand’s speed of change, and
remanufacturing cost influence the optimum prices as well as the optimum green level. For firms that are
engaging in remanufacturing, managerial insights are also provided to assist managers in making pricing
decisions when there exist green consumers. Keywords: pricing, remanufacturing, short life-cycle product,
green consumers INTRODUCTION With the increasing speed of innovation in technological-based
products, new ideas area getting to the market faster and old products are pushed away from the market.
The new models of mobile phones, digital camera, LED TV, and many others are reaching the market faster
from time to time. While these innovation brings excitement to the consumers, environmental burden are
becoming more severe as the old products may have to be wasted faster than technically it should be. On
the other hand, the speed of depletion in natural resources is increasing to support the production of these
new product generations. Attempt to slow down the speed of waste build up and the depletion of natural
resources has been a hot issue in recent years. Of various alternatives, remanufacturing has been
considered as an important way to protect the mother earth from waste build up and fast depletion of natural
resources. Remanufacturing is a product recovery process that transforms used products into “like-new”
condition. For remanufacturing business to stay competitive, demand should exists and supply of materials
in the form of used products should be available in a sufficient amount with adequate quality for
remanufacturing process. Demand for remanufactured products maybe available due to various reasons.
There may be a segment of customers who are willing to purchase the remanufactured goods because it is
priced cheaper compared to the new ones. Others may prefer to purchase them over the new products
because they value the concept of remanufacturing for sustainability reason. Literature has discussed about
this green segment recently (see for example Mostafa 2007, Jiménez-Parra et al. 2014, Wang et al. 2018,
Chen et al. 2018, Zhou & Gupta 2018, Michaud & Llerena 2011, and Finisterra do Paço & Raposo 2010).
Few authors consider that remanufactured products is an inferior substitution to the new one (Debo et al.
2005) unless given green image (Michaud & Llerena 2011). Others argue that there are customers who
values green or remanufacturable product higher (Abeliotis et al. 2010, Finisterra do Paço & Raposo 2010,
Gu et al. 2015) but remanufactured product lower (Gu et al. 2015). All of these suggest that segmenting and
pricing of remanufactured products is a critical decision to ensure business continuity. Research to address
pricing decisions for manufactured products have attracted attentions from researchers. Researchers argue
that appropriate pricing strategy for remanufactured products avoid cannibalization, expand the market and
thus ensure profitability. Guide & Wassenhove (2009), Atasu et al. (2010), Souza (2013) are among the
authors who discussed pricing of new and remanufactured products in a closed-loop supply chain. However,
despite the significant number of publications addressing pricing issues for remanufactured products, little
works has been done in the context of products with short-life-cycle. Gan et al. (2015; 2017; and 2018) are
among those who addressed pricing decisions for short-life-cycle products, aiming to keep both the new and
remanufactured ones to stay competitively in the market. However, none of these incorporated the green
consumer segments. This paper presents models for pricing decision of new and remanufactured short-life-
cycle products where green consumer segment exists and demand is sensitive to price. Two scenarios are
compared. The first one is where the decision is taken independently between the retailer and the
manufacturer. The second scenario is where the two parties jointly making decision on the prices. In the
followings sections we present respectively the literature review, problem descriptions, optimization models,
numerical example, and conclusions. LITERATURE REVIEW Our study relates to two streams of the
literature i.e. pricing of new and remanufactured products, and green consumers. In the first stream, the
importance of pricing decision for new and remanufactured product in a closed-loop supply chain has been
discussed in Guide & Wassenhove (2009), Atasu et al. (2010), Souza (2013). They show that firms should
manage the pricing strategy to avoid cannibalization, expand the market, and ensure profitability when
engaging in remanufacturing practices. There are several works about pricing decision problem involving
manufacturer or remanufacturer. Ferrer & Swaminathan (2006) study a problem where new and
remanufactured products are not differentiated and sold in the same market with the same price. In the first
period, manufacturer offers new product and in the next periods offers new and remanufactured product
based on the returns from the first period. They develop models for finding optimum price and quantity that
maximize profit with various planning horizons under monopoly and duopoly. Further, they extend the work
by differentiating the price of new product from remanufactured one (Ferrer & Swaminathan 2010). Another
pricing model is proposed by Ovchinnikov (2011) where new and remanufactured products are sold in the
same market. They observe customer switching behavior and identify the proportion of customers who
switch from purchasing new product to remanufactured product. In addition to new and remanufactured
products’ prices and quantities, Shi et al. (2011) also considered the cores acquisition price and find their
optimum values that maximize the supply chain total profit. For short life-cycle product, Gan et al. (2015)
propose a pricing and quantity decision model that involves a manufacturer, a retailer and a collector, for
profit maximization. They consider two scenarios i.e. independently optimized profit under Stackelberg game
with manufacturer as the leader, and joint profit optimization. The objective of the proposed model is to find
the optimal wholesale and retail prices for both new and remanufactured products; and the optimal
acquisition and transfer prices. Deng & Yang (2016) study the effect of the uncertain market size in the
second period on the pricing strategies in the remanufacturing market. It is considered important because
they find from empirical and experimental results that in reality market size is uncertain due to several
factors such as environmental awareness, customer’s psychological factors, and governments’ policies.
Furthermore, an insight into game-playing relationship between manufacturers and remanufacturers is
provided, as well as optimum pricing strategy and its sensitivity analyses. Pricing and warranty level
decisions problem for short life-cycle product is studied by Gan & Pujawan (2017) where manufacturer
decides the optimum wholesale prices and warranty level that would maximize profit, while retailer decides
the optimum retail prices. They find that optimum warranty level can be achieved regardless the initial
warranty level set at the beginning of retailer’s optimization, and remanufactured product’s wholesale and
retail prices are influenced by the expansion effectiveness coefficient. As for the sales channel, Gan et al.
(2017) propose a pricing decision model for a closed-loop supply chain involving manufacturer, retailer, and
collector, where the remanufactured products are sold via separate sales channel. Zhou et al. (2017)
investigate pricing decision for remanufactured short life cycle technology where multiple generation product
line is considered as it might result in cannibalization among various generation product line as well as new
and remanufactured products. They consider two scenarios i.e. independent profit optimization and joint
profit optimization. Zhou & Gupta (2018) extend the previous work, by extracting pricing data of new and
remanufactured products for various generations from eBay. They propose price trend functions for these
products with average quality, and also the technology depreciation rates. Several studies are considering
closed-loop supply chain with several players, namely manufacturer, retailer, collector, and remanufacturer.
Qiaolun et al. (2008) propose pricing decision model using Stackelberg game with manufacturer as the
leader, while retailer and collector are followers. They find optimum retail price, wholesale price, and
collection price that would maximize profits. In this setting, new and remanufactured product are not
differentiated, and considered as the same product with the same price. An empirical study that investigates
consumer perceptions of remanufactured product is conducted by Abbey et al. (2015). They study
consumers’ responds to various discounts and brand equity manipulation of remanufactured product. The
results show that discounting had a consistently positive, linear effect on remanufactured product
attractiveness. However, brand equity manipulation turns out to be less important to consumers than specific
remanufactured product quality perceptions. Another finding is that there exist green consumers who find
remanufactured product is more interesting than new product. But, on the other hand, there also exist
consumers who have negative attribute perceptions towards remanufactured product that significantly
reduce its attractiveness. Gao et al. (2016) explore the effect of different channel power structures on the
optimal retail price, investment in collection efforts, and sales efforts under centralized model. For the
decentralized model, they use a game theory with three scenarios i.e. manufacturer Stackelber, vertical
Nash, and retailer Stackelberg. It is shown that, when there is a dominant power shifting from the
manufacturer to the retailer, manufacturer still can benefit from larger demand if collection effort is large
enough. Also, the performance of decentralized strategy can be improved with low price strategy. Jena &
Sarmah (2014) study two remanufacturing firms that compete on price and service with random demand and
uncertainty in collected used products. They develop a model for four remanufacturing configurations and
find the equilibrium decisions, and identify the conditions under which manufacturers are able to use direct
system or integrated system compared to global system. The results show that, when there is an increase in
demand variation, direct system would be better. A return contract mechanism with quantity discount is
proposed to coordinate the decentralized system. Wang & Hazen (2016) study pricing and production
strategies in a capacitated hybrid manufacturing-remanufacturing system. A bidding mechanism is
introduced for collecting returns, called name-your-own-price (NYOP) mechanism. Under this mechanism,
manufacturer’s optimal strategies depend on bidding cost, cost saving of remanufacturing, production
capacity, and market scale. Manufacturer may perform pure manufacturing strategy when remanufacturing
capacity becomes higher than manufacturing’s. When compared to traditional list-price mechanism, NYOP
mechanism is preferable to manufacturer under the conditions of low reverse market share, high
manufacturing cost, sufficient capacity, or low capacity requirement of remanufacturing. Giri et al. (2017)
study dual channel closed-loop supply chain, where the forward channel of new product is conducted
through traditional retail channel and internet channel (e-tail), and the reverse channel is handled through
traditional third party logistics and e-tail channel. There are five scenarios considered i.e. centralized,
decentralized Nash, manufacturer-led, retailer-led, and third party-led decentralized scenarios. They find that
retailer-led decentralized scenario is the most profitable. The second stream of the literature is exploring the
existence of green consumers and their purchase behavior, and then discuss literature in pricing for
remanufactured product with green consumers. Mostafa (2007) investigates the influence of cultural values
and psychological factors on the green purchase behavior of Egyptian consumers. The results from the
structural equation model show that consumers’ natural environment orientation, ecological knowledge, and
environmental concern influence their attitudes towards green purchase. However, the link between
intention to purchase and actual purchase is low. Finisterra do Paço & Raposo (2010) conducted an
empirical study on green consumer market segmentation in Portugal and find that there exist consumers
with environmentally friendly behavior. They also identify environmental and demographic variables that can
differentiate greener segment from other segments. It is also observed that green consumers possess
certain attitudes and behaviors to minimize harmful impact on the environment. Michaud & Llerena (2011)
study consumer willingness to purchase remanufactured product when they are informed the green aspect
of it. An experimental auction was conducted and it is found that providing environmental information will
increase consumers’ willingness to pay for remanufactured product, and decrease consumers’ willingness to
pay for conventional product which is perceived to be more polluting product. However, there is no evidence
that consumers are willing to pay premium for green product. Jiménez-Parra et al. (2014) conduct an
empirical analysis to study the purchase intentions of potential consumers of remanufactured product and
determine their basics characteristics. The findings confirm that key drivers for purchasing remanufactured
products are respect for environment, price and brand reputation, and support from social environment.
Wang & Hazen (2016) study how knowledge of remanufactured products in terms of cost, quality, and green
attributes affects consumers' perception, and further affects consumers' purchase intentions in China. They
find that perceived value has positive effect towards purchase intention. There are several factors that
influence perceived value, which are quality knowledge, cost knowledge and green knowledge. Further
study by Wang et al. (2018) reveals that there is a positive relation between consumers’ greenness and their
preference for remanufactured products. Also, the relations between consumers’ preferences for
remanufactured products and price discount levels and product’s green attributes are verified for three type
of products i.e. technology, household and personal products. Vafadarnikjoo et al. (2018) study key factors
for purchasing remanufactured bike using consumers’ and experts’ opinions. The results show that quality is
the most significant motivation to purchase remanufactured product. The others factors are warranty, price,
information provision, remanufacturer’s reputation, value-added services and retailer’s reputation. The
abovementioned studies show that remanufactured product is viewed as a green product, and firms should
take into account the existence of green consumers because the greenness of the product increases their
purchase intention and willingness to pay. Pricing strategy for remanufactured product with the existence of
a green segment has been studied recently. Gu et al. (2015) study the effect of producing remanufacturable
and non- remanufacturable new products to the production cost and consumer valuations. Also, they
investigate the environmental consequences of designing for remanufacturability, with the assumption that
remanufacturable new products are valued higher, but remanufactured product are valued less than non-
remanufacturable new product. Chen et al. (2018) consider a supply chain where retailer is responsible for
recycling, and manufacturer is responsible for remanufacturing. They apply game theoretic models for two
scenarios i.e. independently optimized based on Stackelberg equilibrum and Nash equilibrium, and joint
pricing scenario within a cooperative game model. Ho et al. (2018) explore the effect of eco-friendly image of
remanufacturing to the product’s sales. Also, they study the impacts of green consumers’ purchase
behaviors to products’ random demands as well as to products’ prices, and develop a model to find the
optimum prices that maximize profit. The results show that when the size of the green market is large
enough, new and remanufactured products can be easily distinguished, therefore manufacturer need to
gradually increase the price gap between two products such that consumers can differentiate them easily. A
study on pricing decision and coordination of green electronic product is studied by Zhu & Yu (2018). They
use dynamic game model to find optimal pricing strategy and the double marginal effect is coordinated
through revenue sharing contract, as well as two toll contracts. The degree of consumer preferences
towards green remanufactured product is also studied, and they find that when the preference increases the
service differentiation among new, remanufactured, and refurbished products is reduced. However, when
the consumer preference is lower, it significantly affects the remanufactured product’s price. Giri et al. (2018)
develop two models with one manufacturer and one retailer. The first model considers price sensitive
demand and is dependent on warranty period, while the second model considers price sensitive demand
that is dependent on greening level and warranty period. The models are solved under three scenarios i.e.
centralized, decentralized, and revenue sharing contract. They conclude that the second model gives better
results. Although the prices are higher, the market demand increases due to higher greening level for lower
warranty period. These studies show that it is important to consider green consumers in pricing decision.
Our works is closely related to Giri et al. (2018) in terms of green consumers but we are focusing on short
life-cycle products where the demand has specific characteristics. We consider price sensitive demand with
green consumers, and the decision variables are the retail and wholesale prices of new and remanufactured
products, and the green level that maximize the profits. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION The product considered
in this study is a short life-cycle product which bears obsolescence effect after a certain period such that the
demand would increase significantly in the introduction and growth phases, but decline rapidly afterwards.
We use time frames that represent the product’s life cycle, either for new and remanufactured products as
shown in Figure 1 where demand capacities of new and remanufactured products depends on the function
characteristics or patterns as well as the length of time frames. A short life-cycle product usually has short
useful life, which is typically less than 2 years (Kamath & Roy 2007), therefore it is reasonable to use a
single period, since the future demand is not guaranteed (Galbreth & Blackburn 2005). Market is price
sensitive, and there exists green segment. We consider manufacturer and retailer in the pricing decision,
and explore two scenarios i.e. independent and integrated scenario. Demand capacity for this product is
adopted from Gan et al. (2015) where the governing functions for the demand patterns are  () = { 1() = 1+− ;
0 ≤  ≤   2() = (−)+ ;  ≤  ≤ 3  ℎ  = − 1 0  = 1 + − 1() = 1+ℎ−(−1) ; 1 ≤  ≤ 3  () = { ℎ = − 1  2() = (−3)+ ; 3 ≤  ≤   ℎ 0 
= 1 + ℎ−(3−1) where () and () are the demand patterns for the new and the remanufactured products. U is
maximum possible demand for the new product, ? is the time of highest demand, λ is the speed of the
change in demand. Parallel definitions are applicable for V, t3, dr0, and η, respectively, for the
remanufactured products Modelling Assumptions ? Consumer can differentiate new and remanufactured
product, therefore the prices are differentiated.  is retail price of new product, and  is retail price of
remanufactured product. Manufacturer also differentiates both products hence the wholesale prices are  and
 for new and remanufactured products, respectively. Figure 1. Demand patterns for new and remanufactured
products ? Demand capacity depends on parameters of short life-cycle function characteristics, and we
define  as demand capacity of new product and  as demand capacity of remanufactured product, as follow ?
Green segment consumers value environmental-friendly product higher, therefore they have higher
preference towards remanufactured product, and might be willing to pay premium price for remanufactured
product. ? The attractiveness of remanufactured product can be improved by manufacturer’s efforts such as
customer education, green campaign, green remanufacturing processes, and marketing. We define  > 0 as
the green level, which means higher  translates to higher attractiveness for green consumers. ? Demands
are price sensitive and depend on market capacity. For remanufactured product, demand also increases
linearly with green level (as in Gu et al. 2015, Giri et al. 2018, Zhu & Yu 2018). Therefore, Demand of new
product = (1 −  + ) Demand of remanufactured product = (1 −  +  + ) where ,  > 0 are demand’s price
sensitivity coefficient, ,  > 0 are substitute-product coefficient, and  > 0 is green-level-demand-expansion
coefficient ? The effort to implement a certain green level requires an investment and we use quadratic
function to represent it (as in Gu et al. 2015, Giri et al. 2018), i.e. 2, where  > 0 is green- level-investment
coefficient ? Unit cost of manufacturing new product is higher than unit cost of remanufacturing used
product, i.e.  >  List of notations Decision variables: All variables are non-negative.  : retail price of the new
product;  : retail price of the remanufactured product;  : wholesale price of the new product;  ≤   : wholesale
price of the new product;  ≤   : green level; Parameters: All parameters are non-negative.  : demand capacity
of the new product  : demand capacity of the remanufactured product  : new product’s price sensitivity, i.e.,
the sensitivity of the demand for the new product to a change in the price of the new product  :
remanufactured product’s cross-price sensitivity, i.e., the sensitivity of the demand for the new product to a
change in the price of the remanufactured product  : remanufactured product’s price sensitivity, i.e., the
sensitivity of the demand for the remanufactured product to a change in the price of the remanufactured
product  : new product’s cross-price sensitivity, i.e., the sensitivity of the demand for the remanufactured
product to a change in the price of the new product   : speed of change in demand capacity for new product :
speed of change in demand capacity for remanufactured product  : unit manufacturing cost of producing the
new product  : unit remanufacturing cost of producing the remanufactured product  : green-level-demand-
expansion coefficient  : green-level-investment coefficient  : contracted revenue sharing portion
OPTIMIZATIONS Independent Scenario In this scenario, manufacturer and retailer are independently
making pricing decision under Stackelberg game where manufacturer is the leader. The objective is to
maximize profits. Demand information is known by manufacturer and retailer. At the beginning of the pricing
mechanism, as the Stackelberg leader, manufacturer gather retailer’s optimal response when given certain
wholesale prices. Based on this response, manufacturer decides on new and remanufactured wholesale
prices as well as the green level to maximize her profit. The backward induction process begins with
retailer’s optimization and is followed by manufacturer’s optimization. Retailer’s optimization: Max  ,  Π = (1 −
 + )( − ) + (1 −  +  + )( − ) (1) The respective first and second order derivatives are: Π = (−2) + ( + ) + ((1 + ) −
) = 0 Π = ( + ) + (−2) + ((1 +  + ) − ) = 0 2Π2 = −2 2Π 2 = −2 2Π 2Π =  +  = The Hessian matrix for this
problem is 2 = [−2+ −2+] , and |2| = 4 − ( + )2 It is obvious that the first sub-determinant is negative, i.e. −2 <
0, and the second sub- determinant or the determinant of Hessian is positive when 4 > ( + )2. Proposition 1:
The retailer’s profit function Π is concave in  and  if 4 > ( + )2 (2) Proposition 2: The optimum retail price for
new product (∗) and optimum retail price for remanufactured product (∗) in retailer’s profit function are: ∗ = 1
+ 2 + 3 + 4 ∗ = 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 (3) (4) where 1 = 4(2−)−(−+2)22 1 = 4−(+)2 −2 2 = 4−(−+2)2 2 = 4(2−)−(−+2)22
3 = 4−(+)2 (+2) 4 = 4−(+)2 (+2)+2 3 = 42−(+)2 4 = 4−(+)2 (2+)+2 Manufacturer’s optimization: M,ax,  Π = (1
−  + )( − ) + (1 −  +  + )( − ) − 2 (5) subject to retailer’s responses to manufacturer’s wholesale prices, which
are ∗ and ∗ as given in Proposition 2. Hence manufacturer’s optimization problem can be expressed as Max
, ,  Π = (1 − (1 + 2 + 3 + 4) + (1 + 2 + 3 + 4))( − ) + (1 − (1 + 2 + 3 + 4) + (1 + 2 + 3 + 4) + )( − ) − 2 (6) The
first and second order derivatives are: Π = {2(−1 + 1)} + {(−2 + 2) + (−1 + 1)} + {(−3 + 3} − {((−1 + 1) − (1 − 4
+ 4)) + (−1 + 1)} = 0 Π = {(−2 + 2) + (−1 + 1)} + {2(−2 + 2)} + {(−3 + 3 + )} − {(−2 + 2) + ((−2 + 2) − (1 − 4 +
4)} = 0 Π = {(−3 + 3)} + {(−3 + 3 + )} + {−2} − {(−3 + 3) + (−3 + 3 + )} = 0 2Π2 = 2(−1 + 1) = 11 2Π2 = 2(−2 +
2) = 22 2Π 2 = −2 = 33 2Π 2Π = (−2 + 2) + (−1 + 1) = 12 = 2Π 2Π = (−3 + 3) = 13 = 2Π 2Π    = (−3 + 3 + ) =
23 = The Hessian matrix of manufacturer’s optimization problem is 11 3 = [12 13 12 22 23 13 23 ] 33 The
first sub-determinant 11 is negative, the second sub-determinant i.e. 1122 − 122 should be positive, and |3|
should be negative to ensure concavity. Proposition 3: The manufacturer’s profit function Π is concave in , 
and  if a) 1 − 1 > 0 (7) b) 4(−1 + 1)(−2 + 2) − ((−2 + 2) + (−1 + 1)) > 0 (8) 2 c) 2(−1 + 1) (−2 + 2) + (−1 + 1)
(−3 + 3) [(−2 + 2) + (−1 + 1) 2(−2 + 2) (−3 + 3 + )] < 0 (9) (−3 + 3) (−3 + 3 + ) −2 Proposition 4: The optimum
wholesale price for new product (∗), optimum wholesale price for remanufactured product (∗), and optimum
green level (∗) for manufacturer’s profit function are the solution to the following linear system: 2(−1 + 1) [(−2
+ 2) + (−1 + 1) (−3 + 3) (−2 + 2) + (−1 + 1) (−3 + 3) 2(−2 + 2)  (−3 + 3 + )] [] = (−3 + 3 + ) −2  ((−1 + 1) − (1 −
4 + 4)) + (−1 + 1) [(−2 + 2) + ((−2 + 2) − (1 − 4 − 4))] (10) (−3 + 3) + (−3 + 3 + ) Integrated decision Under the
integrated decision scenario, manufacturer and retailer are jointly making the pricing decisions as well as the
green level with a goal to maximize total profit. In this setting, manufacturer and retailer make pricing
decision as a unity so the only pricing decision considered are the retail prices which directly impact the
demand. They sign a contract on revenue sharing where a certain portion () of the revenue will be received
by manufacturer and the rest of it by retailer, and the manufacturer agrees to offer lower wholesale prices.
The integrated profit function is the summation of retailer’s and manufacturer’s profit functions, so the
optimization problem becomes Max , ,  Π = {(1 −  + )( +  − ) + (1 −  +  + )( +  − ) − 2} + {(1 −  + )((1 − ) − ) + (1
−  +  + )((1 − ) − )} M,ax,  Π = (1 −  + )( − ) + (1 −  +  + )( − ) − 2 The first and second derivatives are: Π =
(−2) + ( + ) + ((1 + ) − ) = 0 Π = ( + ) + (−2) + () + ((1 +  ) − ) = 0 Π = () + (−2) + (−) = 0 2Π 2 = −2 (11) (12) 2Π
2 = −2 2Π 2 = −2 2Π 2Π   =  +  = 2Π 2Π    = 0 = 2Π 2Π    =  = The concavity of this problem can be inspected
from the Hessian matrix, −2  +  0 3 = [ +  −2  ] 0  −2 |3| = −2(4 − ( + )2) + 222 The first sub-determinant −2 is
obviously negative. The second sub-determinant i.e. 4 − ( + )2 should be positive, and |3| should be negative
to ensure concavity. Proposition 5: The joint profit function Π is concave in ,  and  if a) 4 > ( + )2 b) (4 − ( +
)2) − 22 > 0 Proposition 6: (13) (14) The optimal selling price for new product (∗) and remanufactured
product (∗), and the green level (∗) in the joint model scenario are:  ∗ = (4−2(−422)−1+((2+2)+22)+22)(2+2)
∗ = 4−2(42+2−1((++))2+)2+22222 (15) (16) ∗ = 4−22+(41(−+()+−)2)(+2+2)2+222 (17) where 1 = −(1 + ) +  2
=  − (1 +  ) Proposition 7: Under the optimum setting in the integrated decision problem, relations between
green level and (1) demand capacity for remanufactured product, (2) selling price of remanufactured
product, (3) remanufacturing cost are as follow (1)   > 0, which shows that the green level increases when
the demand capacity for remanufactured product increases. With higher demand potential for
remanufactured product, manufacturer gets higher opportunity to attract the green segment by increasing
the green level; (2)   > 0, this result shows that the green level increases as the price of remanufactured
product increases. Since the market is price sensitive, as the price is getting higher, manufacturer needs to
offer a higher green level of the remanufactured product to the green segment, as to maintain the sales
level; (3)   < 0, explains the decrease in green level as the remanufacturing cost increases. The higher the
remanufacturing cost, manufacturer would decrease the green level in order to maintain selling price as well
as profit margin. Proof. See Appendix 1 Revenue sharing between manufacturer and retailer depends on ,
the contracted revenue sharing portion, hence ? Manufacturer’s profit per unit of new product =  +  −  ?
Manufacturer’s profit per unit of remanufactured product = +  −  ? Retailer’s profit per unit of new product =
(1 − ) −  ? Retailer’s profit per unit of remanufactured product =(1 − ) −  NUMERICAL EXAMPLE In this
numerical example we use price sensitivity parameters that are similar to (Gan et al, 2018) i.e.  = 0.003,  =
0.0001,  = 0.004, and  = 0.0002. The parameters describing demand capacity of short life-cycle products, or
in brief we use the term ‘short life-cycle determinants’ are similar to Gan et al. (2015), where new product’s
parameters are  = 1000, 0 = 90, with varying  = 0. 05, and remanufactured product’s are  = 500, 0 = 50, and 
= 0. 05 . Selling horizon consists of four time segments with 1 = 1,  = 2, 3 = 3, and  = 4. The unit
manufacturing and remanufacturing costs are  = 90 and  = 60 respectively. Parameters related to the green
level are  = 0.002, and  = 20. The optimization problems are solved using Matlab R2014, and the results are
analyzed to find the behavior of pricing decision when green consumers are considered. Also, sensitivity
analyses are conducted by varying several important parameters, namely, the green-level-demand-
expansion coefficient, the unit remanufacturing cost, the demand parameters, and the short life-cycle
determinants, to see their effects to the profit of manufacturer, retailer and the total profit. Numerical
Example Results for Independent Decision Problem The results of independent decision problem is shown
in Table 1. The green level responses to the model parameters can be observed in Figure 3 and 4. The
increment in demand parameter that represents new product’s price sensitivity () is responded by higher
optimum green level. As the market is getting more sensitive to new product’s price, the attractiveness of
remanufactured product can be improved by increasing green level, especially for green consumers. When
green-level-demand-expansion coefficient () increases, the optimum green level also increases, because the
effectiveness of increasing it is higher. However, when remanufactured product’s price sensitivity to
remanufactured product’s demand increases, it is followed by a decreasing green level, since the market is
more sensitive to remanufactured product’s price, so the effort to improve green level would not be effective.
Figure 4 shows the effect of remanufacturing cost to green level which is inversely proportional. The higher
the remanufacturing cost the lower is the optimum green level, which is described in proposition 7. Also, as
the green-level-investment coefficient () increases the optimum green level decreases. Table 1. Numerical
example’s results varying , , , , , ,  (independent decision) lmbd nu a b cr gamma rho Pnw Pn Qnty_n Prw Pr
Qnty-r theta Profit_M Profit_R 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
0.05 0.003 0.002 0.05 0.003 0.003 0.05 0.003 0.004 0.05 0.003 0.005 0.05 0.003 0.004 0.05 0.003 0.004
0.05 0.003 0.004 0.05 0.003 0.004 0.05 0.002 0.05 0.003 0.05 0.004 0.05 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 60 60 60 60 40 50 60 70 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
60 60 60 60 60 0.002 60 0.002 60 0.002 60 0.002 60 0.0005 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.01 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 20 211.71 20 210.92 20
210.90 20 210.91 20 210.99 20 210.98 20 210.92 20 210.46 20 205.90 20 208.96 20 209.94 20 210.92 20
211.90 20 298.01 20 210.92 20 168.43 20 143.27 20 213.14 20 210.43 20 210.92 20 211.69 10 210.84 20
210.92 30 210.95 40 210.96 273.69 273.66 273.66 273.66 273.70 273.69 273.66 273.39 270.74 272.92
273.29 273.66 274.03 402.01 273.66 210.19 172.33 275.69 273.72 273.66 273.94 273.61 273.66 273.67
273.68 406.39 412.89 411.18 409.63 412.51 412.58 412.89 415.43 440.31 416.43 414.66 412.89 411.12
450.98 412.89 370.90 327.41 443.10 426.46 412.89 406.55 413.32 412.89 412.75 412.68 118.64 118.11
118.09 118.10 117.43 117.56 118.11 122.63 167.02 108.93 113.52 118.11 122.70 104.52 118.11 124.74
128.67 265.64 166.60 118.11 102.01 118.87 118.11 117.86 117.74 243.66 243.14 243.12 243.13 242.48
242.61 243.14 247.53 290.58 238.35 240.75 243.14 245.53 261.23 243.14 234.28 229.02 452.96 311.98
243.14 220.47 243.88 243.14 242.90 242.78 78.57 86.65 86.47 86.03 86.61 86.62 86.65 86.91 89.47
108.18 97.42 86.65 75.89 37.63 86.65 110.54 124.68 170.28 129.02 86.65 65.09 86.70 86.65 86.64 86.63
1.36 1.43 1.42 1.42 0.35 0.70 1.43 4.14 19.60 2.49 1.96 1.43 0.90 0.73 1.43 1.77 1.97 8.94 3.90 1.43 0.61
2.93 1.43 0.94 0.70 54,029.94 54,921.19 54,694.96 54,488.51 54,881.14 54,889.14 54,921.19 55,140.80
52,927.42 56,873.39 55,846.41 54,921.19 54,097.74 95,472.76 54,921.19 36,185.62 25,925.63 87,979.40
64,809.51 54,921.19 52,201.68 54,963.95 54,921.19 54,906.94 54,899.82 35,012.28 36,737.25 36,614.47
36,457.59 36,698.26 36,705.90 36,737.25 36,997.72 39,601.19 40,631.61 38,659.73 36,737.25 34,864.16
52,800.05 36,737.25 27,595.26 22,025.33 59,615.87 45,747.01 36,737.25 33,017.78 36,781.06 36,737.25
36,723.16 36,716.21 Total Profit 89,042.21 91,658.44 91,309.44 90,946.10 91,579.40 91,595.05 91,658.44
92,138.51 92,528.61 97,505.00 94,506.14 91,658.44 88,961.90 148,272.82 91,658.44 63,780.88 47,950.95
147,595.27 110,556.52 91,658.44 85,219.46 91,745.01 91,658.44 91,630.10 91,616.03 The sensitivity
analysis plots are shown in Figure 5–10 as follows ? The higher customers’ price sensitivity to new products
(), the lower the profits of both manufacturer and retailer, as seen in Figure 5. However, manufacturer’s profit
plummets faster than retailer’s. On the other hand, an increase in customer’s price sensitivity to
remanufactured product () would decrease the profits, but now retailer’s profit declines more rapidly. Figure
6 shows this result. The existence of green segment allows remanufactured product’s retail price to be
higher than new product’s. When  is lower, the demand capacity of remanufactured product is absorbed
better and it is also responded by higher optimum green level to attract green consumers, as shown in Table
1, therefore the optimum retail price is higher. This results shows that firm should perform market survey to
determine price sensitivity and then use them to decide green segment strategies for pricing decisions. ?
The effect of demand’s speed of change represented by  for new product, and  for remanufactured product
can be observed in Figure 7, where the highest profit is attained at 0.05 either for manufacturer or retailer.
This result shows that it is important that firm manages the promotion such that the increase in demand
would not too fast to achieve sufficient demand capacity during the growth period before it decreases fast
due to short life- cycle characteristic. ? Manufacturer’s profit is increasing with green-level-demand-
expansion coefficient () until  = 0.005 but decreasing at  = 0.01, but for retailer it is always increasing, as
shown in Figure 8. When  is getting higher, it is responded by a very high optimum green level, therefore the
attractiveness of remanufactured product is increasing significantly followed by higher remanufactured
product’s prices and lower new product’s prices, which is then reduce manufacturer’s profit, which can be
observed in Table 1. When green segment is quite large, then  is quite high, and firms should increase the
green level of the product to attract green consumers, but not too high as it would erode the sales of the new
product. ? Remanufacturing cost () is inversely proportional to profits received by manufacturer as well as
retailer, which is shown in Figure 9. This can be explained by the effect of remanufacturing cost to retail
prices. When  is higher, prices are increasing, which then decrease the demanded products. Also, the
optimum green level is decreasing because otherwise it would be too costly for remanufactured product. ?
Green-level-investment coefficient () does not have significant effect to profit earned as shown in Figure 10,
because the higher  is responded by lower optimum green level, and it keeps the prices relatively stable, as
seen in Table 1. Figure 3. The effect of price sensitivity (, ) and green-level-demand-expansion coefficient ()
(independent scenario) Figure 5. The effect of price sensitivity () to manufacturer’s, retailer’s and total profits
(independent scenario) Figure 4. The effect of remanufacturing cost () and green-level-investment coefficient
() (independent scenario) Figure 6. The effect of price sensitivity () to to manufacturer’s, retailer’s and total
profits (independent scenario) Figure 7. The effect of demand’s speed of change (, ) Figure 8. The effect of
green-level-demand-expansion to manufacturer’s, retailer’s and total profits coefficient () to manufacturer’s,
retailer’s, (independent scenario) and total profits (independent scenario) Figure 9. The effect of
remanufacturing cost () to manufacturer’s, retailer’s and total profits (independent scenario) Figure 10. The
effect of green-level-investment coefficient to manufacturer’s, retailer’s and total profits (independent
scenario) Numerical Example Results for Integrated Decision Problem In this setting, manufacturer and
retailer act as one unit and make pricing decision that maximize total profit. The wholesale prices are agreed
to be  = 90 and  = 40, and contracted revenue sharing portion is  = 40%. The results can be seen in Table 2.
Total profit in integrated decision is 32.5% higher than independent scenario. Since the contract requires the
manufacturer to provide lower wholesale price, then retail prices also become lower. Retail price for new
product in integrated scenario is 26.6% lower than independent scenario, and retail price for remanufactured
product is 47.5% lower. Demand for new product increases 44.7% and for remanufactured product 73.2%.
The revenue sharing contract also enable both manufacturer and retailer to receive higher profit i.e. 33.4%
and 31.1% respectively compared to independent scenario. The sensitivity of parameters are consistent with
the independent scenario as shown in Figure 11- 16. It is observed when green-level-demand-expansion
coefficient increases to  = 0.01, retailer’s profit exceeds manufacturer’s profit, because the optimum green
level is increasing significantly which required higher investment by manufacturer. On the other hand, the
price of remanufactured product is increasing as a respond to higher interest of green consumers to buy
remanufactured product, which is beneficial to the retailer. Also, the effect of remanufacturing cost in the
integrated scenario is less significant since the wholesale prices are contracted as fixed values. Table 2.
Numerical example’s results varying , , , , , ,  (integrated decision) lmbd nu a b cr gamma rho Pnw Pn
Qnty_n Prw Pr Qnty-r theta Profit_M Profit_R 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.003 0.002 0.05 0.003 0.003 0.05 0.003 0.004 0.05 0.003 0.005 0.05 0.003 0.004 0.05
0.003 0.004 0.05 0.003 0.004 0.05 0.003 0.004 0.05 0.002 0.05 0.003 0.05 0.004 0.05 0.005 0.003 0.003
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 60 60 60 60 40 50 60 70 60 60 60 60
60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 0.002 60 0.002 60 0.002 60 0.002 60 0.0005 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.01 0.002
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 20 20 20 20
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 10 20 30 40 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00
90.00 90.00 216.08 216.17 216.17 216.17 216.13 216.14 216.17 216.42 217.74 216.17 216.17 216.17
216.17 301.97 216.17 173.32 147.63 220.81 217.70 216.17 215.66 216.22 216.17 216.15 216.15 736.16
747.18 744.07 741.28 747.18 747.18 747.18 747.17 747.16 745.14 746.16 747.18 748.19 838.54 747.18
655.80 564.43 747.12 747.16 747.18 747.18 747.17 747.18 747.18 747.18 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00
40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00
40.00 40.00 40.00 164.97 164.88 164.87 164.87 163.63 163.88 164.88 172.52 212.05 155.01 159.95
164.88 169.82 169.22 164.88 162.72 161.42 303.77 210.72 164.88 149.70 166.26 164.88 164.43 164.21
373.22 401.93 400.82 398.92 396.82 397.83 401.93 433.00 593.88 443.22 422.57 401.93 381.28 402.19
401.93 401.80 401.72 470.29 434.88 401.93 385.85 407.52 401.93 400.10 399.19 4.98 5.34 5.33 5.30 1.32
2.65 5.34 14.33 38.74 5.86 5.60 5.34 5.09 5.57 5.34 5.23 5.17 12.42 7.68 5.34 4.57 10.83 5.34 3.55 2.66
80,294.10 82,505.19 82,188.09 81,864.11 82,594.95 82,577.78 82,505.19 81,793.66 73,557.07 91,226.95
86,701.71 82,505.19 78,637.40 119,846.67 82,505.19 63,034.30 50,700.98 110,639.84 91,841.35
82,505.19 79,425.75 82,398.20 82,505.19 82,538.24 82,554.29 51,198.56 53,349.59 53,159.88 52,935.62
52,730.71 52,852.68 53,349.59 57,278.45 82,172.76 53,079.33 53,275.60 53,349.59 53,301.32 101,208.27
53,349.59 32,332.88 22,036.41 98,644.56 67,938.59 53,349.59 48,660.55 54,035.30 53,349.59 53,126.95
53,016.71 Figure 11. The effect of price sensitivity () to manufacturer’s, retailer’s and total profits (integrated
scenario) Total Profit 131,492.67 135,854.78 135,347.96 134,799.73 135,325.66 135,430.47 135,854.78
139,072.11 155,729.83 144,306.27 139,977.30 135,854.78 131,938.72 221,054.93 135,854.78 95,367.18
72,737.39 209,284.40 159,779.93 135,854.78 128,086.31 136,433.50 135,854.78 135,665.19 135,571.00
Figure 12. The effect of price sensitivity () to to manufacturer’s, retailer’s and total profits (integrated
scenario) Figure 13. The effect of demand’s speed of change (, ) to manufacturer’s, retailer’s, and total
profits (integrated scenario) Figure 15. The effect of remanufacturing cost () to manufacturer’s, retailer’s and
total profits (integrated scenario) Figure 14. The effect of green-level-demand-expansion coefficient () to
manufacturer’s, retailer’s, and total profits (integrated scenario) Figure 16. The effect of green-level-
investment coefficient () to manufacturer’s, retailer’s and total profits (integrated scenario) Managerial
Implications From the optimum results and the numerical example with sensitivity analyses, we provide
several managerial implications as follow: ? The existence of green segment is beneficial to manufacturer as
well as retailer, as it increases their profits. Therefore, managers need to perform sound market survey to
identify the green segment and their willingness to pay, hence identify the magnitude of green-level-
demand-expansion coefficient. ? Manufacturer should be careful in increasing green level when the size of
green segment is large. This is caused by the higher attractiveness of remanufactured product for green
consumers which is responded by increased optimum green level, followed by higher investment cost that
erodes manufacturer’s profit. ? Manufacturer and retailer are better off when working together in the pricing
decision under the integrated scenario with revenue sharing contract, as the total profit gains would be
higher compared to the independent scenario. They need to agree on the contracted revenue sharing
portion, as well as the lower wholesale prices. ? Price sensitivity plays a significant role in the model,
therefore firms should perform a reliable market survey to better understand the extent of new product’s
price sensitivity as well as remanufactured product’s price sensitivity to decide the optimum green level in
order to attract green consumers. ? Since demand’s speed of change is not always better when it is
increased, firms should manage the promotion and product immersion such that the increase in demand
would not too fast to achieve sufficient demand capacity during the growth period before it decreases fast
due to short life-cycle characteristic. ? Under independent scenario, manufacturer should calculate the
remanufacturing cost carefully because it would influence the retail prices, both new and remanufactured
product. Higher remanufacturing cost would hurt the firms’ profits. CONCLUSION This paper addresses a
pricing decision problem for short life-cycle product with price sensitive demand and green consumers exist.
Two supply chain players considered, i.e. manufacturer and retailer, and they decide on wholesale and retail
prices of new and remanufactured products with a certain green level. We proposed independently
optimized profit scenario under Stackelberg game with manufacturer as the leader, and integrated scenario
where the two parties jointly making decision on the prices. The results show that the integrated scenario
achieves higher profit compared to the independent scenario, and both players are better off under the
integrated decision. We find that the existence of green segment, which is represented by the magnitude of
green-level-demand-expansion coefficient, increases the profit of manufacturer and retailer to a certain level.
However, there is a certain limit to the magnitude of green-level-demand-expansion coefficient before it
erodes manufacturer’s profit when the green level is too high. Also, price sensitivity of new and
remanufactured products, demand’s speed of change, and remanufacturing cost influence the optimum
prices as well as the optimum green level. The proposed models can assist managers in making pricing
decisions and assess to what extent the green level should be increased in order to attract green
consumers, how to manage the promotion and product’s immersion to the market, and understand the
importance of price sensitivity coefficients. In this study, we have not included the effect of warranty period
of the products, which could be significant to consumer’s preference to purchase new and remanufactured
products. This could be a focus to be explored further. This study can also be extended by considering the
return rate in the collection of used product because the quantity and quality of supply of used products are
uncertain, so it is important to assess the market driven collection strategy as opposed to waste stream
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